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Retail chains essentially practice one of two broad strategies in setting prices across their stores.  The 
more straightforward is to set a chain- or country- wide price.  Alternatively, managers of retail chains 
may customize prices to the store level according to local demand and competitive conditions.  For 
example, a chain may price lower in a location with lower demand and/or more competition.  
However, despite having the ability to customize prices to local market conditions, some choose 
instead to commit to uniform pricing with a “one price policy” across their entire store network.  As 
an illustration, we focus on UK supermarket chains.  Is there an advantage to be gained from 
deliberately choosing not to price discriminate across locations? We show generally and illustrate 
through means of a specific model that there exists a strategic incentive to soften competition in 
competitive markets by committing not to customize prices at the store level and instead adopt 
uniform pricing across the store network, and to raise overall profits thereby.  Furthermore, we 
characterize quite precisely the circumstances under which uniform pricing is, and is not, profitable 
and illustrate that under a range of circumstances uniform pricing may be the preferable strategy. 
Key words: Chain-store retailers; price discrimination; uniform pricing; local pricing; commitment  
 
1.  Introduction 
Different retail locations have different costs and, what is our concern here, different degrees of 
competition.  For example, wage levels may vary by location and a particular market player may face 
fewer competitors in some locations than others.  Hence, we might expect prices to be customized across 
locations.  As an illustration, take the milestone antitrust investigation by the US Federal Trade 
Commission of the proposed Staples/Office Depot merger.1  Here, a key element the FTC uncovered was 
the adoption of markedly differing pricing practices across locations of differing competitive intensity, 
with a clear link between the number of competing stores of similar type and the level of price.2  This is 
third degree price discrimination, but in an oligopoly context (Borenstein 1985; Holmes 1989).   
                                                     
1  Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc. and Office Depot, Inc., Civ. no.97-701 (TFH), 1997.   
2  The FTC found that average prices varied by as much as 16% depending on the extent of local competition, with 
Staples and Office Depot respectively pricing on average 13% higher and 5% higher when they were respectively 
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 A commonly held view is that firms are better off practicing this form of price discrimination 
between locations of differing competitive intensity.  Against this view, Corts (1998) and other 
subsequent authors have shown that in situations of “best response asymmetry”, where one player’s 
strong market is the other’s weak market, firms can be worse off practicing price discrimination.  As 
Corts puts it, “ … if firms differ in which markets they target for this aggressive pricing and competitive 
reactions are strong, prices in all markets may fall.” (p. 321).3  But in most retailing situations, such as 
office equipment supplies, rival firms will hold the same opinion about which market is strong and which 
is weak as a result of differing degrees of competition – a situation of best response symmetry rather than 
asymmetry.  A market where they face significant competition from the other player or players will be a 
weak market, compared to a market where the other key player(s) is not present.  Corts’s analysis does 
not address this case. 
Under these circumstances, a clear puzzle is why in some prominent cases of best response 
symmetry, in distinction to Staples/Office Depot, firms practice uniform pricing rather than varying price 
by location.4  It is this puzzle that is the focus of our paper.5  As we document in detail below, the key 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the only office stationery superstore present in a local market compared to when all three such players (including 
Office Max) were present.  For a case summary, see Dalkir and Warren-Boulton (1999). 
3  Moreover, the finer the degree of market segmentation and the more precise the information on consumers, in the 
limit offering personalized pricing (i.e., first-degree price discrimination), the more exaggerated the net effect on 
prices and thereby profits may become.  In this regard, see Shaffer and Zhang (2002), Chen and Iyer (2002), Liu and 
Serfes (2004), Acquisti and Varian (2005), and Ghose et al. (2005).  On the related literature on using coupons to 
discriminate between groups of consumers in oligopoly, see Shaffer and Zhang (1995) and Bester and Petrakis 
(1996) on inter-store (geographic) discrimination and Besanko et al. (2003) on an intra-store discrimination (such as 
issuing customized coupons at the point of sale). 
4  Even so, it is quite apparent that price discrimination according to location is common across many retail sectors 
beyond office stationery, including US grocery retailing (Montgomery 1997; Chintagunta et al. 2003), fast food 
chains (Thomadsen 2005) and cars (Goldberg and Verboven 2005).  
5  In the situation analyzed by Corts (1998), best-response asymmetry resulting in “all-out competition” entails all 
profits being lower with price discrimination.  Here a prisoner’s dilemma situation exists whereby the competing 
firms have a joint incentive but not an individual incentive to avoid this situation by committing to uniform pricing.  
In contrast, as we have shown in an earlier paper (Dobson and Waterson, 2005) with a simple parametric model, 
both unilateral and joint incentives to commit to uniform pricing may exist in situations of best response symmetry. 
The present paper considers much more generally the nature of the trade-offs involved and characterizes more 
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players in the United Kingdom (“UK”) supermarket industry, which has a turnover over five times as 
large as the US office equipment market, have maintained or enhanced their policies on uniformity of 
pricing across location within mainland Britain.  Note it is crucial to the success of a uniform pricing 
policy that there is prior commitment to such a policy, rather than simultaneous choice of pricing policy 
and prices themselves.  We show that UK supermarkets have made such commitments.   
 Given this underlying commitment, we demonstrate at a very general level that a profit incentive 
exists in favor of uniform pricing, in some but not all situations of best response symmetry.  The 
argument is essentially as follows:  It is well known that in a differentiated product market setting with 
Bertrand price competition, both players in a duopoly can benefit if one can commit to a higher price.6  A 
commitment to uniform pricing will provide a commitment to a higher price if demand facing the firm in 
a monopoly market is less elastic than in the duopoly market.  Then if the gain in profits from the duopoly 
market exceeds the loss from the monopoly market, the strategy is profitable.   
 We go on to further characterize analytically the type of market for which this incentive will 
exist.  A key feature is that larger markets have consumers with a wider range of tastes than do small 
markets.  Following this general analysis, we demonstrate using a parameterized example that a very wide 
range of degrees of competitive intensity is consistent with profits either being enhanced or at least 
reduced only slightly by a policy of uniform pricing.  Thus, small positive benefits arising from other 
aspects of uniform pricing (including reductions in promotional costs and lessening of antitrust attention) 
may well be sufficient to ensure that uniform pricing develops as a resilient practice across the industry. 
 We proceed as follows.  The next section sets out the nature of pricing and pricing commitment in 
the UK supermarket industry as an illustrative case.  Following this, section 3 develops the general 
analytical framework just outlined and characterizes the circumstances where there can be a unilateral 
profit incentive for uniform pricing.  Section 4 utilizes a parameterized example to illustrate the range of 
market circumstances conducive to uniform pricing being more profitable local pricing.  Section 5 
extends the domain to incorporate joint incentives to adopt uniform pricing in the presence of competing 
                                                                                                                                                                           
precisely the kind and range of market circumstances whereby commitment to uniform pricing can be a profitable 
strategy.    For further background on these issues, see the detailed surveys by Stole (2007) and Armstrong (2006).    
6  For an example in a different context, see Bonanno and Vickers (1988).   
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chain-store retailers, also practical considerations where local pricing may be more expensive to operate 
than national pricing. Section 6 contains our concluding remarks. 
 
2. Uniform Pricing in UK Grocery Retailing 
In this section we chart sufficient material related to UK grocery retailing to show the very 
considerable extent to which the major chains price uniformly across areas despite facing very different 
competitive environments (and costs) across those areas.  We also document the commitments firms use 
in maintaining their uniform pricing policies.   
Grocery retailing represents the largest retail sector in the UK, worth around $160bn in 2005.  
Four retailers – Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda (a Wal-Mart subsidiary) and Morrison/Safeway – dominate the 
national market, accounting for 75% of sales of grocery items (i.e., food and drink, cleaning products, 
toiletries and household goods), and indeed 30% of all retail sales in the UK.7  These four supermarket 
retailers have primarily positioned themselves as “one stop shops”, operating with very wide product 
ranges in large format stores.  As such, they jointly account for 95% of grocery sales for stores exceeding 
1,400 sq meters (which has been viewed by the UK competition authorities as the critical size 
distinguishing one-stop grocery shops, serving primary shopping needs, from smaller stores catering for 
“top-up” and “convenience” grocery shopping).   
 While most of the retail grocery chains operate on a national level in the UK, there is 
considerable variation in regional and local market shares and concentration levels.  Table 1 provides 
some summary evidence, based on a very detailed report into the sector undertaken by the UK’s 
Competition Commission (“CC” hereafter) in 2000.8  In particular, high levels of local concentration9 
                                                     
7  For instance, see IGD (2005) and Mintel (2005), where the measure of retail sales covers all consumer retail 
expenditure on goods (i.e. excluding services) with the exception of automobiles.  Tesco alone is estimated to take 
more than one eighth of UK consumer retail expenditure on this measure. 
8  The table shows the separate positions of Morrison and Safeway prior to their merger in March 2004. 
9  In determining the degree of local concentration and the extent of store choice facing consumers at the local level, 
the UK competition authorities decided to examine local markets in respect of drive times between stores or choice 
in postcode (zip code) areas.  For UK supermarkets, the Competition Commission (CC 2000, Appendix 6.3) 
identified that out of 1,700 stores surveyed, 175 stores were found to have a “monopoly” or “duopoly” status in local 
catchments (in respect of 10-minute drive times in urban areas and 15-minute drive times in rural areas around each 
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were found in more rural areas10 (notably in Scotland and Wales) and certain urban areas where a 
proliferation of stores from the same chain existed11.  In addition to market structure differences, 
consumer income levels also differ from region to region (tending to be higher in the southern part of the 
UK) and from district to district (tending to be higher in urban areas as opposed to rural areas12), 
suggesting the presence of variation in local consumer demand, incomes and possibly willingness to pay.   
Table 1.  Market Characteristics in UK Grocery Retailing, 1999 
 
National Market 
Shares 
Regional Market Shares Local Concentration  
Main UK 
grocery “one-
stop shop” 
retailers 
 
General character 
& pricing policy* 
 
Total 
grocery 
stores 
All 
grocery 
stores 
(%) 
Grocery 
stores 
> 1,400 sq 
m (%) 
Highest 
regional 
share 
(12 broad UK 
regions) (%) 
Highest broad 
postcode share 
(120 narrow 
regions) (%) 
% stores in 
local monopoly
(10/15-minute 
drive time) 
% stores in local 
duopoly 
(10/15-minute 
drive time) 
Tesco Value-led Hi/Lo  642 23.0 28.5 46.5 53.6 6.0 10.3 
Sainsbury Hi/Lo 424 18.7 24.8 35.9 56.7 0.5 4.1 
Asda EDLP 227 12.2 16.8 24.8 46.8 0.0 3.1 
Safeway Hi/Lo 498 11.5 13.8 28.4 51.0 9.2 9.8 
Morrison EDLP + deals 95 3.9 5.4 21.9 45.0 0.0 4.2 
* Based on the authors’ interpretation of retailers’ submissions on their pricing practices (CC, 2000, Appendix 5.2), 
where “Hi/Lo” refers to “high-low” promotional pricing, and “EDLP” refers to “every day low pricing”    
Source: Adapted from CC (2000; Tables 5.2, 5.3, & 8.30, Appendices 5.2 & 7.1) 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of the stores).  However, when restricted to competition between the major “one-stop-shop” grocery retailers and 
with 10-minute drive times, then 627 out of the 1,700 stores were found to have “monopoly” or “duopoly” status. 
10  This is perhaps not surprising with rural areas being less densely populated and store replenishment being more 
difficult in remote areas (i.e. in the absence of a nearby regional distribution centre). 
11  For example, it has been estimated that the market leader, Tesco, has the largest market share in 67 of the 120 
postal districts in the UK, having more than 40% of the market in 14 districts, and more than 45% in five towns 
(“Power of ‘big four’ revealed in new figures”, The Guardian (London), Nov. 10, 2005).  At the more disaggregated 
postal code level, it has been reported that out of the 1,452 postal areas of the UK, Tesco was found to have “an 
almost total stranglehold” on the retail food market in 108 areas, while accounting for over 50% of grocery spending 
in a further 104 areas (“Tesco profits feed fears of a stranglehold”, Sunday Times (London), Apr. 18, 2004). 
12  Even so, the range of income per capita varies considerably within both urban and rural areas.  For instance, the 
CC (2000, Appendices 13.4 and 13.5) found that for a sample of urban areas, at postcode sector level, income per 
capita ranges from as low 35% to as high as 155% of the national average. 
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With differences in both local competition and local demand conditions, it might be thought that 
retailers would seek to take advantage of opportunities to set prices differently from store to store.  In 
particular, retailers might set higher prices in areas where local competition was limited and/or average 
income levels were high, while setting lower prices in areas of more intense local competition and/or low 
average incomes.  However, for the sector as a whole, the CC (2000) found an almost even split between 
those firms that adjusted prices on a local basis and those that adopted uniform prices across all their 
stores.  Of the fifteen main grocery chains operating in the UK, seven were found to vary prices from 
store to store based on local competition and demand conditions – a practice the CC called “local price 
flexing” – while eight used national pricing, with no local variation in prices.   
 Table 2 shows the extent and character of local price flexing identified by the CC amongst the big 
5 firms in 1999.  To this we have added data from a later CC report in 2003.  In 1999, individual product 
prices were found in some retailers to vary considerably (by as much as 100%), but average prices 
differed across each chain by less than 3%.  The CC investigated the basis on which local pricing 
operated, identifying the critical factors influencing store-level pricing.  For the retail groups that did vary 
prices, both differences in local demand (in respect of income or regional effects) and local competition 
(in respect of local market power or facing particular price-focused competitors) were found to be 
important in determining the price band applied to individual stores and the variation in prices across the 
store chain.13  Cost elements (like differences in store size) were also found to play a role, but not so 
significantly as to explain the full extent of store-to-store price variation.14  
 
                                                     
13  US evidence, e.g. the findings by Hoch et al. (1995) and Chintagunta et al. (2003) in relation to Dominick’s Finer 
Foods (“DFF”) (a large supermarket chain in the Chicago area), shows that zone pricing is mostly driven by 
differences in local consumer characteristics rather than by local competition or costs.  More generally, on the range 
of pricing policies used in US grocery retailing, see Shankar and Bolton (2004) and Ellickson and Misra (2007). 
14  For instance, the CC undertook detailed analysis on the relative profitability of stores operated on different price 
tiers by Tesco and Sainsbury.  In both cases, the CC found that the higher prices in their higher price tier stores were 
more than was required to meeting higher operating costs, or indeed higher asset costs (CC 2000; Tables 8.31 & 
8.32, paragraphs 8.109 & 8.114). 
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Table 2.  Local Price Flexing by UK Grocery Retailers 
 
   1999  2003 
Store fascia 
 
Price-flexed 
products % 
Widest price 
range on any 
price-flexed 
product 
Average price 
range for price-
flexed products 
(%) 
Basket price 
range across 
stores (sales 
weighted) (%) 
 
Price-flexed 
products % 
Tesco 8.5 43.4 19.2 1.69 0 
Sainsbury* N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
Asda 0 0 0 0 0 
Morrison 0 0 0 0 0 
Safeway 59.5 31 4.3 1.09 N/A 
* Sainsbury provided its data in a different way, but it did exhibit some price flexing in 1999. 
Source: 1999 data adapted from CC (2000, tables 7.2 and 7.3, Appendices 7.5 and 7.8); 2003 data adapted from CC 
(2003, paragraphs 5.35 to 5.41) 
 
However, the pattern of pricing practices in the sector changed markedly over the following four 
years.  While price flexing continued to be used by some of the smaller chains, by 2003, both Sainsbury 
and Tesco had voluntarily moved away from store pricing based on location (CC 2003; paragraphs 5.36 
and 5.37).15  Furthermore, in March 2004, Morrison acquired Safeway and set about converting all the 
latter’s stores into the Morrison format, in the process abandoning Safeway’s store-by-store promotional 
pricing policy in favor of its national pricing policy.  
Remarkably, uniform pricing has become the dominant form of pricing in this sector, and the 
major retailers, including Tesco, reportedly the world’s third largest retailer, have eschewed the 
opportunity to customize prices on a store-by-store basis in favor of national pricing. 
Commitment Devices 
If national pricing is to have any possible strategic role in influencing the pricing decisions of 
rival retailers (i.e. be seen as beyond mere “cheap talk”), then the chain-store retailer would need visibly 
to pre-commit to uniform pricing in such a fashion that the other retailers could be certain that the chain-
store’s hands are tied when it comes to actual determination of prices.  
                                                     
15  However, while setting the same prices across the supermarket format, both retailers might vary prices between 
formats (i.e. between their separately branded convenience store chains as compared to their supermarket chains) – 
on the basis of operating cost differences. 
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In this regard, it is clear from the statements supermarket chains have made to the CC in 2003, 
that there is strong commitment to uniform pricing.  Consider for example the following assessments 
made by the CC with respect to the two chains with the longest commitment:  
Asda said that it would be commercial suicide for it to move away from its highly publicized national 
EDLP pricing strategy and a breach of its relationship of trust with its customers, and it would cause 
damage to its brand image, which was closely associated with a pricing policy that assured the lowest 
prices always. (CC 2003, paragraph 5.38) 
Morrisons told us that it charged the same prices for its products in every one of its stores.  It stated that 
adopting a policy of local prices would be contrary to its long-standing marketing and pricing policy, it 
would damage its brand and reputation built up over many years and would adversely affect customer 
goodwill, as well as being costly to implement and manage. (CC 2003, paragraph 5.40) 
These assessments fit with the public statements made by senior managers of these two 
companies at the time of the 2003 CC inquiry: 
Asda pricing does not discriminate by geography, store size or level of affluence - we have one Asda 
price across the entire country. Our national pricing policy means that all our customers, no matter where 
they live, be it Elgin or Eastbourne, will pay the same low prices they deserve – always. (Tony De 
Nunzio, President and CEO, Asda Stores Limited - www.advfn.com/news_Statement-re-Safeway-
PLC_4628216.html) 
We have a long established value-based national pricing policy - which has operated in Morrisons stores 
since 1958 - with the same single price for every product in each store, wherever a store is located.  We 
have no intention of changing this strategy. It is at the heart of what we do. There will be no price flexing 
in Morrisons stores. (Bob Stott, Managing Director, Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC -
www.mmc.gov.uk/inquiries/completed/2003/safeway/pdf/morrisonnotes.pdf) 
Moreover, the big 4 grocery retail chains continue to emphasize their commitment to uniform, 
national pricing.  For instance, in the wake of yet another CC sector inquiry (begun in 2006 and due to 
conclude in 2008), Sainsbury and Tesco, as the two more recent converts to uniform pricing, have made 
the following public statements: 
Sainsbury’s sets prices nationally by format and does not use price-flexing to exploit areas of higher or 
lower market share.  (http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2006/grocery/main_ 
party_submissions.htm) 
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We [Tesco] understand that customers want low prices, but they also want fair prices. That is why we 
charge the same prices up and down the country. We sell our products on the basis of a national price 
list available for all to see on our website. Even in the few locations that are unable to support more than 
one supermarket, where we are ‘the only supermarket in a town’, we continue to operate on the basis of 
our national price list. (http://www.tesco.com/talkingtesco/lowPrices/) 
The last point in the Tesco statement above is interesting as it shows that the firm is willing to 
support its commitment to uniform pricing by listing its prices on its own website (and even comparing 
those with its main rivals – www.tesco.com/pricecheck).   
Other examples 
Beyond UK supermarkets, uniform pricing is also witnessed in other retail sectors as well.  As 
Dobson and Waterson (2005) observe, these further examples illustrate the range of possible commitment 
devices and policies that may be employed to support the credibility of a uniform pricing strategy.  For 
instance, a retail chain may rely on some expensive commitment mechanism that would render its 
position worse were it not to adopt uniform pricing than if it did so.  In the case of some retailers this 
comes about by publishing all prices in a catalogue which then applies across the whole country, e.g. 
IKEA in furniture and furnishings or Argos in the UK for general merchandise, with no scope for local 
price deviations.  An alternative commitment can arise through national advertising to inform consumers 
about prices (such as practiced in UK electrical goods retailers Currys and Comet) or through use of 
integral price tags standard across a country, or even the whole Eurozone (e.g. top clothing retailers such 
as Sweden’s multinational H&M and UK’s Marks & Spencer). 
A further possibility is for the chain-store retailer to remove local market boundaries to create 
essentially a national market for its own goods.  For example, this might be possible if consumers were 
allowed full access to the store network regardless of their location, with orders taken from any part of the 
country then backed with either home delivery or delivery to the nearest available store (as offered for 
example by a number of UK clothing retailers including Marks & Spencer and Next).  A similar effect 
could arise through a retailer developing an Internet operation to run alongside its store operations, i.e. 
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become a “clicks and bricks” retailer, making a commitment to offering online prices equal to the lowest 
store-level prices.  Indeed, this is a move that Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury have adopted in developing 
online grocery sales in the UK and is also being rolled out by H&M for clothing. 
With this background on UK grocery retailing and these other examples in mind, we now move 
to consider theoretically how pricing commitments to uniform pricing may affect market outcomes in a 
retail oligopoly context, examining how and when this might be – and equally when it might not be – a 
profitable strategy.   
3.  Analytical Framework 
We start with a general examination of the strategic implications for adopting either a local or a 
uniform pricing policy across the stores operated by a multi-market retail chain.  In the next section, we 
develop a further parameterized model to provide additional insights.  Our starting point, though, is a 
general demand setting where we show the existence of a profit motive for a retailer to choose 
deliberately not to discriminate across the local markets it serves even when these markets differ in the 
extent of demand and intensity of competition (and so would naturally appear to be candidates for 
profitable price discrimination across localities).  Specifically, when a retailer is not a monopolist in all its 
local markets, strategic considerations impact the decision over whether or not to price discriminate 
because they affect the pricing decisions of other retailers, and thus market outcomes.  
We take the simplest case for illustration where a retailer operates in two local markets - in one 
market it faces no competition (i.e. a local monopoly), in the other it competes against another firm.  We 
characterize the demand conditions that provide an incentive for pricing uniformly rather than locally, 
expressed in the form of a set of demand elasticity conditions for the two markets.  We go on to examine 
the nature of preferences that are likely to give rise to this incentive. 
Characterizing the general issue 
Firm A sells in two independent markets, 1 and 2.  Costs are the same in each market and 
marginal costs are constant, at a unit rate c.  The demand functions are continuous and downward sloping. 
We first state an obvious result, demonstrated in Holmes (1989): 
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LEMMA 1. Ignoring competitive conditions, if a uniform price is to be set across the two markets, this 
price will be between the prices the firm would have set had it maximized profits by setting prices 
individually in each market. 
Now consider the following scenario.  In market 1, firm A is a monopolist whilst in market 2, a 
larger market, it faces competition from another firm (B).  Competition in the duopoly market is in prices, 
with the products of the two firms being imperfectly competitive substitutes (|∂qi/∂pi| > ∂qi/∂pj > 0; i, j = 
A, B; i ≠ j).  We assume that the demand facing firm i, qi(pi, pj), is sufficiently concave in its own price, pi, 
for profit to be strictly quasiconcave in pi (Vives 1999, p149).  The firm in question (A) has to consider 
whether to set uniform prices across the two markets, or alternatively to price locally.16   
PROPOSITION 1. (a) Existence: In the scenario outlined above, there is a range of demand parameters for 
which there is some profit incentive for firm A to set a uniform price across the two markets rather than 
pricing markets separately.  (b) Necessity: The incentive arises when demand facing A is no less elastic in 
the duopoly market than in the monopoly market.  The firms in market 2 must produce different products. 
PROOF.  Consider the maximization problem for firm A, assuming it sets prices separately in each market.  
Its profits are 
)),()(.(),()(),()( 22211222211122211 BABAAABAAA ppqpqcppqppqpppp +−+=π+π≡π
The first order conditions, succinctly written, are 
In the second condition for equality in (1) above, maximization is done assuming pB2 fixed.  Call the 
prices thereby set p   and p     respectively.  
On the other hand, if firm A decides to practice, and commit to, uniform pricing, its profits are 
                                                     
)1(0
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1
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A
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),()( 221 BAAAA ppp π+π≡π
16 Note that Holmes (1989), who demonstrated existence of an incentive for uniform pricing through an example, 
did not examine cases where the number of firms differs across markets.  Another important paper to investigate the 
topic, though in the very different context of “mill pricing”, is Thisse and Vives (1988). 
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Suppressing arguments of the functions temporarily for simplicity, its first order condition is now 
)2(0
*
2
2
221 =⋅∂
π∂+∂
π∂+∂
π∂=π
A
B
B
A
A
A
AA
A
dp
dp
pppdp
d  
since firm A now recognizes the full strategic impact of its price choice.17  Call the optimal uniform price  
p*u  . The second order condition for maximization under uniform pricing is d
2πA(p*u  , . )/dp
2
A     < 0.   
Following Lemma 1, take the case where p*1  > p
*
A  2 .  Turning to the final term in (2), note that since 
∂qA2/∂pB2 > 0, it follows that ∂πA2( . )/∂pB2 > 0.  Furthermore, dpB2*/dpA > 0 since the products are strategic 
Therefore, there exists a non-empty set of prices p
complements in market 2 by assumption.  At p*A   2 we have 
 > 0) for which πA2(p
*
A 2  + ε, p⎯ B2) > πA2(p
*
A 2 , p⎯ B2), 
(4) 
Using the first inequality in (4) together 
where the η’s are price elasticities of dema he industry, F to the firm.18  
*
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he equality in this condition provides a lowe
ow the case where p*1  < p
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A 2  .  Using Lemma 1 in (3) shows that profits for firm A in 
                                                     
*
A 2  + ε (ε
)3(0),(),(),(
2
*
2
2
2
*
22
2
2
*
22
2
2
*
22 >⋅∂
π∂+∂
π∂≡π
A
B
B
BAA
A
BAA
A
BAA
dp
dp
p
pp
p
pp
dp
ppd
where p⎯ B2 is some fixed value.  Then, defining the maximum value of ε in this set by πA2(p
*
A 2  + ε
*, p⎯ B2) =  
πA2(p
*
A 2 , p⎯ B2), a sufficient condition for profits to be higher under uniform pricing is the following 
  p*A 2  <  p
*
1   <  p
*
A 2  + ε
* 
with the normal relationship between prices and demand 
elasticities coming from the first order conditions, we can infer that profits are weakly higher if 
η1I (p*1  ) ≤ η2F (p*A 2) 
nd, superscript I referring to t
Therefore, assuming demand in each market is no more convex in the relevant prices than implied by 
constant elasticity of demand, it will be true that  
 η1I (p
T r boundary for the range over which profits are enhanced by 
uniform pricing.  
Consider n
17 Formally, we have a two-stage game.  In the first stage, firm A commits to uniform pricing.  In the second stage, 
both firms set prices.  Our earlier assumptions on demand guarantee a locally stable Nash equilibrium price for B 
depending smoothly on A’s price. 
18 In marketing, our industry elasticity ηiI  is referred to as the primary demand elasticity for good i  (e.g., Bell et al., 1999). 
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market 2
t 
become
The intuition for the main result is fairly clear.  Given equal industry demand elasticities, a firm 
will wa
where RB is firm B’s reaction function. 
 in market 2, this makes A a relatively fierce competitor for B, 
poly market is relatively less elastic than demand 
on 1 relates to an existence result.  Whilst uniform pricing will 
not be 
specific parametric cases, we consider two general issues. 
 would fall if uniform pricing were introduced.  A rise in price in market 1 would also induce a fall 
in profits.  So, the incentive cannot arise when demand facing A in market 2 is less elastic than in market 1. 
Finally, where the products of firms A and B in market 2 are identical, competition in that marke
s homogeneous-product Bertrand in nature so that the only price which will result in any sales in 
market 2 is pricing at marginal cost and therefore profits will fall under uniform pricing as all profits from 
the monopoly market are ceded. Q.E.D. 
nt to set a lower price in the duopoly market than in the monopoly market.  But competitive 
considerations cannot be ignored.  The two firms’ actions are strategic complements, that is for firm A 
)6(AAB
BA pp
0)),((
2
>π∂ A ppR∂∂
 Thus if firm A sets a low price
meaning that B would want to reduce its price (through the equivalent of equation (6)) for good 2.  In the 
terminology of Bulow et al. (1985), investment in reducing price makes firm A “tough”.  By choosing a 
uniform pricing strategy, thereby raising price in market 2, firm A loses some potential profit in the 
monopolized market.  However by being “soft” in setting a high price in the duopoly market, and as a 
result inducing firm B to set a higher price in market 2, A gains more profit in the duopoly market than it 
would do otherwise and hence may benefit in net terms. 
 On the other hand, if demand facing A in the duo
in the monopoly market, setting a uniform price across both markets would imply reducing price in the 
duopoly market below the price based on elasticity in that market alone.  This would toughen 
competition, which is not in A’s interest.   
It is clear that part (a) of Propositi
profitable should industry demand in the monopoly market be less elastic than in the duopoly 
market, it may but need not be profitable where industry demand in the monopoly market is more elastic.  
In order to characterize this latter situation somewhat more fully without descending immediately to 
Paul W. Dobson and Michael Waterson: Chain-Store Competition: Customized vs. Uniform Pricing                                     Page 14 of 28 
Consider a result due to Holmes (1989) that applies to our firms in the oligopoly market, namely 
 ηF(p) = ηI(p) + ηC(p) (7) 
where t
roducts are substitutes, this is positive. 
C (p*u) > η1I (p*u) – η2I (p*u) > 0 (8) 
lar 
 each other, but we have already s imilar.  Uniform pricing, then, o
become
, f(p), with support [0, ⎯p ] in market 1 such that each 
consum
whence dq(p˜  ) /dp =  – f(p˜  ) .  
We define a simple magnifi
 simple magnification of market 1 then, by simple substitution in (9) we find 
that η1I 
osition: 
pricing does not include cases where market 2 is a simple magnification of market 1. 
The meaning of a simple magnification is that the only difference between the two markets lies in 
the density of consumers.   Their distribution of tastes across the population remains unchanged.  A clear 
he C superscript shows a cross-elasticity of demand between the two firms’ products.  Since the 
p
Taking (7) together with (5), it is necessary for profits to be higher under uniform pricing that  
 η2
This captures somewhat more specifically how the products in market 2 must be relatively simi
to een they must not be too s nly 
s profitable over a limited parameter range. 
Furthermore, let us define a “simple magnification” of demand.  Assume there is an atomless 
distribution of willingness to pay across consumers
er represented will purchase one unit if price is below their p value, zero otherwise.  Therefore 
demand, q˜  , in market 1 at any given price level p˜   will be given by 
consumers in market 2 becomes (1+θ)f(p), θ > 0.    
)9()~()().(~ pFpFdppfq
p
−=≡
~p
∫
cation as occurring when the distribution of willingness to pay across 
When market 2 is a
(p˜ ) = η2I (p˜ ), violating condition (8) for uniform pricing to be more profitable.  Therefore by 
contradiction, we have established the following prop
PROPOSITION 2:  The range of demand parameters under which there is a (strict) incentive for uniform 
19
                                                     
19 This is an assumption made for example in Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) in relation to small towns in the Midwest 
of the US.  In terms of a linear demand function, demand in market 2 would have the same intercept but a shallower 
slope than in market 1 under a simple magnification. 
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alternati
ibution of willingness to pay in market 1 is f(p) with 
support
ve view is that in larger markets tastes spread, so that there are some “high end” consumers in a 
large market not represented in a smaller market.   
We define an alternative case where the larger market is a “valuation-expanding” magnification 
of the smaller market.  This occurs when the distr
  [0, ⎯p 1] , whilst the distribution of willingness to pay in market 2 is (1+θ)f(β.p), θ > 0, β > 1 with 
support [0, β ⎯p 1] .  Here, simple manipulations of the elasticity formula show that there is at least a region 
of demand where industry demand elasticity in market 2 is less than in market 1.20  With valuation 
expansion, the formula for market 2’s industry elasticity of demand (after slight simplification) is 
)()(
)
~
~(~)~(
pβFpβF
pβfppη I −=  2
with a natural tendency for the denominator to be larger than that for market 1 at any price. So, we have 
REMARK 1: Where market 2 is a “valuation-expanding” magnification of market 1, there is a clear 
To take a specific case of the above framework, and give some further insight on the practical 
nting a more profitable strategy than local pricing, consider the situation 
where c
er, B, and to allow for differences 
potential for uniform pricing to be profitable. 
4. Linear Demand Case 
scope for uniform pricing represe
hain-store retailer A operates in two separate local markets characterized by (potentially) different 
linear demand specifications.  As a basis for making comparisons, we assume that in market 1, where it 
holds a monopoly position, the chain-store retailer faces normalized linear demand with unit intercept and 
unit slope such that inverse and direct demand take the respective form: 
 pA1(qA1)  =  1 – qA1  ;  qA1(pA1)  =  1 – pA1 (10) 
In market 2, where A competes with another (independent) retail
in the character and extent of demand across the two markets, we assume symmetric linear (inverse) 
demand of the following form:  
      pA2(qA2,qB2) = 1/(1 – v) –(qA2 + s·qB2)(1 – m)/(1 + m)  ;  pB2(qB2,qA2) = 1/(1 – v) – (qB2 + s·qA2) (1 – m)/(1 + m) (11) 
                                                     
20 Again referring to the linear demand case, if β > 1 and θ = 0 then we have demand in market 2 being parallel to 
but above demand in market 1.  In that case, demand is less elastic at any price (up to ⎯p  ) in market 2. 
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Here, v 
 increasing (respectively, decreasing) in the duopoly market vis-
Furthermore, to keep the analysis straightforward and tractable, we assume that in regard to operating 
costs the retailers operate under common constant marginal and unit costs in the respective markets they 
 
t L) and under uniform pricing (with 
Using (13) an
∈ [0,1) represents the extent of “valuation expansion” relative to the monopoly market (with a 
value of zero indicating no valuation expansion) and m ∈ (-1,1) is the relative demand “magnification” 
factor, corresponding to consumer density
à-vis the monopoly market as m becomes higher (lower).  Thus, a “simple magnification” corresponds to 
v = 0 for m ≥ 0 (i.e. where consumer density is higher in the duopoly market than the monopoly market 
but both markets exhibit the same reservation prices).  Parameter s ∈ [0,1) captures the degree of 
“substitutability” between the retailers’ products such that the products are demand independent when s = 
0 and approach being viewed as perfect substitutes as s → 1. 
 The direct demand functions in the duopoly market for retailers A and B are respectively 
)2(1
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svm
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2222 BA
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serve, which without further loss of generality are taken to be zero. 
With these demand and cost assumptions in place, it is straightforward to determine the outcomes 
under local pricing and under uniform pricing, with the derivation shown in the online technical appendix 
in the e-companion.  From this, we find that the combined profit (i.e., across both the markets served) for 
the chain-store retailer under local pricing (denoted by superscrip
superscript U) are respectively: 
)13(
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d (14), we find that the difference in combined profit for the chain-store retailer is 
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The denominator in (15) is positive and so is the first term on the numerator, thus the sign of the 
expression hinges on the sign of the two terms in square brackets on the numerator.  We can establish that 
these two terms can be positive or negative and that the signs do not necessarily coincide.  Specifically, 
conditions exist under which (15) is negatively signed with uniform pricing offering a greater profit than 
local pricing for the retailer, as summarized in the following result: 
PROPOSITION 3. (a) For v ∈ (0,1) and s ∈ (0,1), there exists a zone in (v,s) space for which the chain-
store retailer strictly prefers uniform pricing.  This zone has two boundaries.  The first boundary is given 
by the condition that the price elasticity facing the firm is the same in both markets, η1I  = η2F., which is 
unaffected by the value of m.  The other boundary is η1I  = η2F ZA, where ZA ≡ XA/YA, and this lies below (i.e. 
outside) the first in (v,s) space, with the size of the zone where uniform pricing offers greater profit 
decreasing in m. (b) For v = 0, the chain-store retailer is strictly (weakly) better off with local pricing 
when s > (=) 0.    
PROOF.   See the online technical appendix in the e-companion. 
To provide some further insight into the nature and extent of the zone where uniform pricing 
offers the chain-store retailer greater profit than local pricing, Figure 1 diagrammatically represents the 
results in Proposition 3, taking m = 0 as the base case.  In accordance with Proposition 1 in the previous 
section, the upper/inner boundary of this zone is where the elasticity of demand facing the chain-store 
retailer is the same in both markets, i.e. where η1I  = η2F .  This corresponds to where the prices are the same 
in both markets regardless of the chosen pricing policy, i.e. that under local pricing pLA1 = p
L
A2 where p
L
A1 = 
1/2 and pLA2 = (1 – s)/[(1 – v)(2 – s)], so that this boundary is where v = s/(2 – s).  Above this line η1I  > η2F , 
and here the retailer strictly prefers local pricing (as uniform pricing exacerbates competition in the 
duopoly market while also reducing profits in the monopoly market).  Below this line, where η1I  < η2F , 
there is a limited area of (v,s) space where a commitment to uniform pricing can sufficiently dampen 
competition in the duopoly market without unduly losing too much profit in the monopoly market from a 
lowered price to the extent that overall profits are higher compared to local pricing.  
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Figure 1.  Pricing Policy Preferences for Chain-Store Retailer A (m = 0) 
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As shown by Proposition 1, the other (in this case, lower/outer) boundary of this zone lies inside s 
= 1, such that were the products perfect substitutes then uniform pricing would result in prices collapsing 
to zero in both markets to ensure non-zero quantities (which must necessarily offer lower profits than 
local pricing when there is positive demand in the monopoly market).  Moreover, as shown by 
Proposition 2, this other boundary lies above v = 0, equating to a simple magnification in the duopoly 
market compared to the monopoly market, so that a valuation expansion is required for uniform pricing to 
offer higher profits than local pricing 
Figure 1 also shows the relevant boundaries when m is close to its respective extreme values, 
taking as illustrations the cases where m = 99/100 and m = -99/100 (i.e. where consumer density in the 
duopoly market compared to the monopoly market is respectively extremely large or extremely small).  
The upper/inner boundary is unaffected by the value of m (since this relates a price equivalence 
independent of m, i.e. where v = s/(2 – s)).  The lower/outer boundary is, though, affected by the value of 
m.  The boundary where m = 99/100 is shown as a dotted line and the case where m = –99/100 is shown 
as a dot-dashed line.  As may be expected, the former lies above/inside the latter (since the cost to lost 
monopoly market profit is greater in order to raise duopoly market prices), with the solid line boundary 
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where m = 0 being between the two.  Yet, it is striking how little difference the value of m makes on the 
size of the zone where uniform pricing offers higher profits, which is due to limited impact m has on the 
value of ZA.21  In other words, differences across the two market types in respect of consumer density per 
se do not significantly limit the scope for uniform pricing.  Rather it is the extent of valuation expansion 
(v) and degree of product substitutability (s) that matter more significantly; where the greater the former 
then the greater the latter is required, and vice versa, for uniform pricing to be preferred. 
5. Further Considerations 
The results in the previous two sections, and diagrammatically illustrated in Figure 1, point to the 
scope for uniform pricing offering strictly higher profits than under local pricing being quite restricted.  
However, there may be other practical considerations, as we alluded to in the Introduction, which may 
extend the scope for adopting uniform pricing.  In this section we build on the linear demand analysis in 
the previous section to illustrate two possible considerations: first, where other, rival chain-store retailers 
exist and they can coordinate their pricing policy choices; second where local pricing may involve some 
additional costs that reduce net profits under this pricing policy choice.     
5.1. Competing chain-store retailers 
 The first consideration of how the presence of rival chain-stores might affect preferences is 
achieved through a straightforward extension of the linear demand framework by allowing retailer B to be 
in a symmetric position to retailer A such that whilst operating in market 2 in competition to A it also 
operates in a monopoly market of its own (market “3”) which is identical to market 1 in respect of 
demand conditions.  With this set up, we contrast the situation where both retailers adopt local pricing 
with where they both adopt uniform pricing to consider joint preferences over pricing policy. 
 When both chain-store retailers set local prices then the outcomes are the same as previously 
where a single chain-store retailer competes with an independent retailer using local pricing (since the 
presence of a separate monopoly market has no impact on the outcomes from competing in the contested 
duopoly market).  Accordingly, we can denote (using the superscript LL) the total profit for the two chain-
store retailers under local pricing as respectively πLA 
L   and πL B
 L , given by (13).   
                                                     
21  For illustration on the narrow range of values, see the online appendix in the e-companion. 
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The derivation of the outcomes when both chains adopt uniform pricing is given in the online 
The difference between the total profit for each chain-store retailer when they both use
appendix in the e-companion.  From this, we find that the total profit for each chain-store retailer is 
 local 
pricing 
PROPOSITION 4. (a) For v ∈ (0,1), a zone exists in (v,s) space for which the retailers jointly prefer mutual 
 in the e-companion. 
As Proposition 4 establishes, comparing the competing chain-store retailers’ joint profits when 
they bo
)16(
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and when they both use uniform pricing is  
As with the previous profit comparison given by (15), the denominator in (17) is positive and so is the 
first term on the numerator, thus the sign of the expression hinges on the sign of the two terms in square 
brackets on the numerator.  As before, we can establish that conditions exist under which (17) is 
negatively signed.  Formally, as the following result shows, there is greater scope for a joint rather than a 
private preference over uniform pricing: 
uniform pricing over mutual local pricing, as defined by two non-overlapping boundaries, the 
upper/inner one in (v,s) space being η1I = η2F , and the lower/outer one being η1I = η2F ZJ, where ZJ ≡ XJ/YJ. (b) 
This zone covers a greater range of (v,s) space than the zone for private preferences towards uniform 
pricing as established in Proposition 3. 
PROOF. See the online technical appendix
th adopt uniform pricing with when they both adopt local pricing reveals that they have joint 
incentive to adopt uniform pricing across a greater region of (v,s) space than when only considering their 
private incentives.  The extent of this increased scope for uniform pricing is illustrated in Figure 2, where 
the solid lines correspond to respective boundaries for the case where m = 0.   
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Figure 2.  Joint Preferences for Two Chain-Store Retailers (m = 0) 
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Here, the upper/inner boundary of the zone supporting a joint preference for adopting uniform 
pricing 
ope for a joint incentive for uniform pricing 
applies 
when XJ is negative), it 
remains the same, i.e. where η1I  = η2F  with v = s/(2 – s).  However, the lower/outer boundary is 
shifted out significantly.  Accordingly, if the two chain-store retailers can devise a means to coordinate 
their pricing policy choices, e.g. simultaneously make mutually binding commitments to uniform pricing, 
then the scope for uniform pricing increases substantially. 
Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, this significant sc
regardless of the value of m, though the area of (v,s) space supporting joint uniform pricing 
increases as m declines (since proportionately less profit has to be sacrificed in the respective monopoly 
market to soften competition and thereby boost profits in the duopoly market).   
 Finally, since ZJ can be negative for certain parameter values (i.e., 
follows that a valuation expansion, i.e. v > 0, is not a necessary condition to support a joint preference for 
uniform pricing.  Specifically, the zone in (v,s) space where uniform pricing offers greater profits than 
local pricing includes negative values of v, with the implication that the result from Proposition 2 does not 
necessarily hold for joint preferences over pricing policy.  In other words, it is possible even with a 
valuation contraction (with lower reservation prices in the duopoly market compared to the monopoly 
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market) for a joint preference for uniform pricing to exist.  However, the key result from Proposition 1, 
that the elasticity of demand facing the retailer be no less in the duopoly market than in the monopoly 
market is still seen to apply as a necessary condition to support uniform pricing since the upper/inner 
boundary remains the same as with private preferences, i.e. η1I  = η2F  with v = s/(2 – s).  
5.2 The costs of local pricing  
of these considerations, while going back to the context of unilateral 
llustrate the 
case wh
                                                     
 Turning to the second 
preferences addressed in section 4, Figure 1 showed the profit boundaries when the chain-store retailer’s 
combined profits are equal under each pricing policy choice.  However, we can also consider how much 
the boundaries alter if the chain-store retailer is willing to accept a limited gap in (gross) profits between 
uniform pricing and local pricing.  For instance, this might be considered by the retailer when local 
pricing entails some additional cost that impacts on net profits, e.g. where adjusting pricing on a local 
basis is more expensive than on a national basis (e.g. costs due to separate labeling and ticketing as well 
as more administration and management time) or alternatively where there is a risk of a consumer 
backlash or other adverse sentiment from resentment over geographic price discrimination.    
In order to show just how sensitive the profit comparisons are to such costs, we can i
ere these costs reduce local pricing profits by 1%.22  This is shown in Figure 3, where the 
boundaries correspond to the maximum considered gross profit gap of 1% between the level attainable 
under local pricing compared to that under uniform pricing (for the case where m = 0).  This reveals that 
the upper/inner boundary swings up to the left from the top right corner while the lower/outer boundary 
swings down to the right from the top right corner.23  Accordingly, if the chain-store retailer can accept 
gross profits from uniform pricing being marginally lower than under local pricing then this significantly 
increases the zone where uniform pricing might be chosen.  Note that this particularly applies to lower 
values of v, which we might expect to apply in a practical sense.  For instance, v = 1/6 ≈ 0.167 implies a 
22  This 1% figure is used purely to represent a very marginal difference.  However, it is interesting to note that the 
UK retailer Safeway, prior to being taken over in 2004 by the uniform-pricing retailer Morrisons, was an extensive 
user of local pricing and promotions but where the discounts, printing and administration were estimated to cost 
around 1% of its turnover (McGoldrick 2002, p. 386).  
23  The formulae for the boundary lines in Figure 3 are provided in the e-companion. 
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valuation exp  contrast, the 
6. Conclusion 
onal or regional chain-store groups now dominate most sectors of retailing.  
Compet
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ansion of 10% but the zone applies to s values from zero up to s ≈ 0.55.  In
zone is less expanded for higher values of v, but note that v > 0.5 covers the perhaps less realistic 
situations where valuations expand by over 100%.  Here it is useful to recall that any impact of 
differential pricing on profits will be a second-order effect (change in price and change in quantity); the 
example illustrates how attenuated the profit effect can be as a result in this case. 
 Figure 3.  Preferences allowing for 1% profit gap (m = 0) 
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ition has become focused on a battle between large chains with a resultant squeeze on 
independents.  In their relentless drive for further growth, chains often appear to have the best of both 
worlds.  They have the cost savings and marketing clout of a large purchaser coupled with the potential 
flexibility to tailor offers across the local markets they serve. This potential flexibility has been realized 
through developments in information gathering and processing, allowing marketeers to customize 
marketing mix variables to the store-level (Montgomery, 1997).  The central question for managers we 
I = η2F 
   η1I = η2F ZA 
U
L
LπA
U
 
  >
100
99 πA
L
 
 
πA
U
 
  <
100
99 πA
L
 
 
πA
U
 
  <
100
99 πA
L
 
 
Paul W. Dobson and Michael Waterson: Chain-Store Competition: Customized vs. Uniform Pricing                                     Page 24 of 28 
examine is whether the prospect of tuning prices to particular local conditions can have negative impacts 
on the firm through the competitive process. 
One concern for managers customizing pricing at the store level might be negative consumer 
sentime
retailer’s use of 
geograp
rofit trade-offs involved in determining the aggregate effect, our analysis 
shows t
eless, there is considerably more scope for raising aggregate profits through uniform 
pricing 
                                                     
nt towards a retailer using discriminatory practices that would detrimentally impact on the chain’s 
image and/or have an adverse effect on overall demand.24  Another might be arbitrage.   
In contrast, our focus has centered on competitive aspects.  Specifically, a 
hic price discrimination may impact on competition across the network of local markets served.  
In this context we have shown quite generally that market conditions exist where it will be both 
individually and jointly profitable for retailers to eschew customizing prices and instead set uniform 
prices across their stores.  This means the retailer forgoes high prices and high profits in the local markets 
where it has monopoly power and instead leverages this market power across all its markets to raise 
prices in those markets where the intensity of competition otherwise makes them low.  It entails 
sacrificing some local profits, but with the benefit of softening competition more broadly and sufficiently 
to raise firm profits overall.   
However, given the p
hat the market conditions that support unilateral action in this manner are quite limited, unless 
there are other practical considerations that tip the profit balance in favor of uniform pricing, such as 
higher costs (for ticketing and administration) or reduced demand (arising from negative consumer 
sentiment) from using local pricing.  The main message regarding unilateral choice of a uniform price 
strategy is that it will not be worthwhile if larger markets have a similar character to smaller ones, apart 
from their size. 
Neverth
if other industry players are already committed to uniform pricing  (or where such pricing is 
required by a competition authority either formally through a ban on localized price discrimination or as 
24 Anderson and Simester (2001) raise a quality signaling issue in this regard.  More generally, if negative consumer 
sentiment is the concern then the retailer might look to so-called “micro-marketing” strategies that have broadly 
neutral consumer welfare effects.  For practical suggestions, see Montgomery (1997) and Chintagunta et al. (2003).   
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an implicit condition to allow for other actions, e.g. mergers or store acquisitions from rivals25).  Indeed, 
in the example considered, there was very little to lose from choosing uniform pricing.  This conclusion is 
perhaps the opposite of what a simple consideration of the problem might suggest. 
Beyond our stripped-down model there are likely to be other factors, apart from concerns about 
retail image and pricing costs, which may influence retail managers’ choice of pricing policy.  Demand 
differences between markets may be difficult to determine in practice and be shrouded by uncertainty, 
rendering the second-order profit gain involved in local pricing somewhat speculative.26  Additional 
considerations may temper or reinforce the considerations addressed in this paper.  For instance, in favor 
of local pricing is its greater flexibility and potential for driving out existing competitors or even deterring 
new competitors from entering local markets through selective targeting, allowing the retailer to 
consolidate its local position.  In contrast, the relative inflexibility and greater transparency of uniform 
pricing may be advantageous if it assists in providing a clear, consistent policy that may facilitate greater 
price understanding and easier price monitoring between rivals, lessening competitive intensity (though 
could ultimately be deemed illegal if it amounts to tacit collusion in the form of full parallel pricing). 
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25  For example, further to our discussion of UK grocery retailing in section 2 and especially in the context of several 
major acquisitions that have been made by large (often national-pricing) retailers, the UK competition authorities 
have taken keen interest in even relatively small acquisitions made by retailers using local pricing (e.g. CC 2005).   
26 Introducing uncertainty is likely to have two opposing effects on the deterministic equilibria modeled here in 
sections 3 and 4.  It makes local pricing less likely because the process of determining appropriate prices becomes 
more difficult.  But it also renders strategies like precommitment less plausible. 
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